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Abstract 
We measure the negative externalities experienced by non-winning bidders and examine the 
determinants of these externalities in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) failed 
bank auctions. We show that unsuccessful bidders experience significantly negative 
cumulative abnormal returns when winning bidders enter non-winning bidders’ key markets as 
a new entrant by acquiring relatively larger targets and when infrequent bidders are involved. 
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1. Introduction 
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) provides deposit insurance to bank and 
thrift institution depositors as well as acts as the primary federal regulator of banks. As an 
insurer, it also deals with bank failures in the least costly manner that is consistent with its 
regulatory assignment to preserve and promote public confidence in the US financial system. 
To fulfil this role, purchase and assumption transactions (P&As) are arranged by the FDIC to 
auction failed banks and thrift institutions to healthy banking firms.  
 
In this paper, we examine the externality effects associated with the auctions of failed banks. 
In this study, externalities are measured by bidding banks’ cumulative abnormal returns after 
the auction outcomes are announced. The negative externality hypothesis generally states that 
bidders’ willingness to pay in an auction reflects not only their private valuations of the object 
(e.g. the franchise value of the failed institution’s deposits and the value of some of its assets 
in a FDIC P&A transaction) but also preemptive incentives stemming from the desire to reduce 
negative externalities (Jehiel et al., 1996; Jehiel et al., 1999). Support for the existence of 
negative externalities in auctions has been reported primarily from laboratory experiments (e.g. 
Bagchi and Shor, 2006; Hu et al., 2013). To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to test 
auction externalities with market data.  
 
Our study updates and makes a contribution to the literature regarding FDIC failed bank 
auctions. First, the literature mainly focuses on the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s and 
1990s. The financial crisis between 2007 and 2009, however, also witnessed an increased 
number of commercial bank and savings and loan failures. In total, 492 deposit-taking FDIC 
insured institutions failed in the USA during the period 2007-2013 compared to 29 institutions 
during the previous seven years (see Figure 1). Around 94 percent of these failed institutions 
were subsequently auctioned to healthy banks by the FDIC. These transactions, therefore, 
provide a timely case study to examine these significant economic events as successful auctions 
tend to reduce the cost to taxpayers compared to liquidation (James, 1991). Second, the 
majority of the literature examines acquiring banks. For example, James and Wier (1987), 
Cochran et al. (1995) and Cowan and Salotti (2015) find that winning bidders enjoy significant 
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and positive abnormal returns. The results therefore support the wealth transfer hypothesis. 
Zhang (1997) also finds that winning bidders record positive abnormal returns, which are 
positively driven by their past bidding experience in FDIC auctions. Giliberto and Varaiya 
(1989), on the other hand, examine whether winning bidders in FDIC auctions suffer from the 
winner’s curse (i.e. overpaying for failed banks). The results show that winning bids as well as 
bid levels of all bidders tend to increase with increased competition. As far as we are aware, 
our study is the only one to examine non-winning bidders in FDIC auctions.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Our results show that non-winning banks experience significantly negative cumulative 
abnormal returns of -0.75% surrounding the announcement dates while winning banks record 
significant and positive cumulative abnormal returns, which suggest that the announcements 
of the FDIC P&A outcomes generate negative externalities for the unsuccessful bidding banks. 
Moreover, we find that non-winning banks experience negative externalities when winning 
bidders enter unsuccessful bidder’s key markets as a new entrant by winning relatively larger 
failed banks, which confirm that negative externalities are identity dependent as predicted by 
theory (e.g. Jehiel et al., 1996). While the results remain consistent overall, our further tests 
also show that failed bank auctions generate more significant negative returns when infrequent 
bidders are involved in the auctions. 
 
Our results carry important policy implications as understanding auction externalities helps 
banking regulators examine potential anticompetitive effects of selecting a particular bidder on 
the relevant competitors within a banking market. Negative externalities experienced by non-
winning bidders may also suggest an adverse impact on their performance and in turn the 
soundness of the banking system, in particular during and after a financial turmoil. Moreover, 
our research also suggests that the negative externalities generated by the FDIC failed bank 
auctions may be much greater since not all related competitors participate in the auctions or 
are publically listed. Thus, our research results deserve further investigations from the policy-
makers and market participants. 
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The remainder of our paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the research 
background and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the dataset and methodology. 
We present our results and robustness tests in Section 4. We offer concluding remarks in 
Section 5. 
 
 
2. Research Background and Hypotheses 
Protecting insured deposits in the event of a bank failure is one of the FDIC’s most important 
roles (FDIC, 2014). The FDIC has two basic resolution methods to dispose of an insured 
commercial bank1. In a purchase and assumption (P&A) transaction, the FDIC auctions a 
package of the failed banks assets and the obligation to assume the bank’s liabilities including 
all insured deposits. A deposit payoff is made when the FDIC is unable to find an assuming 
institution in a P&A transaction. In this case, the FDIC pays all of the failed institution’s 
depositors up to the limit of insurance coverage.  
 
P&A transactions are sealed bid first price auctions2. All aspects of the P&A transactions 
and all information concerning the failing bank are held in strict confidence as the marketed 
institution is still an open and operating entity and may find a solution to improve its troubled 
condition and prevent failure on its own at any time before the P&A transaction is completed. 
The FDIC first invites all known qualified and interested potential bidders prior to an auction3. 
After signing confidentiality agreements, bidding banks receive copies of the information 
package, which contains details on the failing institution, the legal documents, the due diligence 
process and the bidding procedures. Bidding banks submit their (sealed) bids to the FDIC once 
they have completed their due diligence 6-15 days prior to the scheduled closing. In the absence 
                                                          
1 The FDIC has also used the third method - Open Bank Assistance (OBA), which allows the FDIC to make loans to, purchase the assets of, 
or place deposits in a failing bank. This resolution method is no longer used due to restrictions imposed under the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 and under The Resolution Trust Corporation Completion Act of 1993.  
2 Klemperer (1999) provides a detailed non-technical survey of auction theory. 
3 Insured depository institutions contact the FDIC to express interest in acquiring financial institutions and indicate the size range of institutions 
and geographic area(s) that interests them. The list of potential bidders is reviewed by the financial regulatory authorities concerned, including 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the appropriate state banking 
authority. 
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of any extenuating circumstances, the FDIC will award the failed bank to the highest bidder if 
the total amount of the FDIC’s expected expenditures is the least costly to the deposit insurance 
fund of all possible methods for resolving the failed institution4.  
 
Subsequently, the chartering authority closes the failed institution and appoints the FDIC as 
receiver. On the same day, usually on a Friday, the FDIC issues a press release about the closure 
of the institution and the outcomes of the P&A transaction (i.e. the name of the bank that 
acquires the failed bank). The press release, however, does not contain information related to 
the auction procedure (e.g. non-winning bidders’ names and their bids). A Bid Summary that 
contains publicly releasable bid information in accordance with the FDIC's Bid Disclosure 
Policy is subsequently made public by the FDIC at least 10 working days after the closure of 
the bank5. The winning bidder reopens the bank usually by the next business day, and the 
customers of the failed institution automatically become customers of the assuming institution 
with access to their insured funds. 
 
Several economic arguments suggest that outcomes of the FDIC failed bank auctions create 
negative externalities for non-winning bidders. First of all, the process of selling a failed bank 
to other banks by the FDIC establishes vertical contractual relationships between a 
monopolistic dealer (i.e. the FDIC as the only agency that markets failed banks in the USA) 
selling inputs (e.g. the failed bank’s deposits/customer base) and several downstream 
heterogeneous competing buyers (i.e. bidding banks in a P&A transaction)6. As pointed out in 
Jehiel et al. (1996), the result of such a sale may affect the nature of the ensuing interaction 
between auction participants. In this study, after the announcement of the P&A transaction, the 
ownership of the failed bank is transferred to the winning bidder, which subsequently may 
change the competitive conditions within a geographic market. For example, the winning 
bidder may be a new entrant in the market and able to establish their market presence rapidly 
by acquiring the existing customer base of the failed bank. This may pose a potential threat to 
the incumbent players in the market. Moreover, as James and Wier (1987) demonstrate, 
                                                          
4 The FDIC Act (Title 12 USA 1823 Section 13) directs the agency to weigh the benefits to the insurance fund of selecting a particular bidder 
against possible anticompetitive effects or adverse effects on the soundness of the banking system. 
5 There is no official guideline when the Bid Summaries need to be made public by the FDIC.  
6 Katz (1989) offers a survey of vertical contractual relations. 
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positive cumulative abnormal returns to  winning bidders in the FDIC auction procedures 
suggest wealth transfers from the FDIC to the acquiring banks, which in turn give these banks 
a competitive advantage and affect expected profits in future interaction with unsuccessful 
bidders. The negative externality hypothesis in our study, therefore, implies that non-winning 
bidders experience negative externalities in the FDIC failed bank auctions. Negative 
cumulative abnormal returns to unsuccessful bidders’ stock as well as positive (or non-
negative) cumulative abnormal returns to winning bidders when auction results are announced 
are therefore consistent with the hypothesis.  
 
Despite these arguments that support the negative externality hypothesis, we also 
acknowledge an alternative hypothesis that may predict positive shareholder wealth effects for 
non-winning bidders. The point of departure for this view is that the winner of a sealed-bid 
auction may suffer from ‘winner’s curse’ by failing to estimate the true value of the auctioned 
object and paying more for the object than its true worth (Roll, 1986; Varaiya, 1988). As a 
result, negative cumulative abnormal returns accrue to the winning banks, which are also 
negatively associated with the level of the competition of the auction (indicated by the number 
of bidders). The winning banks’ competitors (e.g. other unsuccessful bidders in the auction), 
as a result, may experience positive externalities. The literature, nevertheless, tends to only test 
‘winner’s curse’ hypothesis and overlook the possible positive externality effects P&A 
transactions generate. While the majority of the studies apply event study methodology and 
find positive and significant cumulative abnormal returns to winning bidders, which is 
inconsistent with the ‘winner’s curse’ hypothesis (e.g. Cochran et al., 1995; Zhang, 1997 etc.), 
Giliberto and Varaiya (1989) examine the value of bids using a sample of 322 FDIC auctions 
during the period 1965-1985 and find that winning bids as well as bid levels of all bidders tend 
to increase with increased competition, which may suggest bidders’ failing to adjust for the 
‘winner’s curse’7. 
 
Further, beyond developing an understanding of what externality effects non-winning 
bidders may experience, it seems necessary and relevant from a policy perspective to 
                                                          
7 The inconsistent findings may be due to different sampling approaches. Ciliberto and Varaiya (1989) examine a relatively longer period and 
include both publicly listed and non-listed acquiring banks.   
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investigate what explains the magnitude of externality effects as such analysis enables 
regulators to better anticipate how the bidders are likely to respond to the bidding outcomes. 
First, the negative externality hypothesis states that when bidders do not obtain the object of 
the auction, they are no longer indifferent about the identity of the winner of the auction (Jehiel 
et al., 1996). Therefore, bank-specific characteristics that indicate a winning bidder’s market 
competitive position (such as its size, market share etc.) may be significantly related to non-
winning bidders’ negative cumulative abnormal returns. On the other hand, if the overall 
externality effects are positive for non-winning bidders due to ‘winner’s curse’, the relationship 
between the cumulative abnormal returns to each non-winning bank and the level of bidding 
competition indicated by the number of bidders should remain positive (James and Wier, 1987). 
 
 
3. Data Description and Empirical Methodology 
3.1 Data Description 
To examine the FDIC P&A auctions’ external effects, data on insured commercial bank 
failures are obtained from the FDIC. There are 492 bank failures in the acquired data during 
the period 2007-2013. Out of the initial sample, we eliminate twenty six cases which are labeled 
as no acquirer (i.e. all deposit payoff transactions are excluded). We then retain the P&A 
transactions where at least winner or one non-winning bidding bank is publically listed. Our 
final sample consists of 206 P&A transactions taking place from September 2007 to December 
2013. Note that data on bidders who are invited to participate in the auctions but who decline 
to bid are unavailable8. Also, since bidders are allowed to submit more than one bid in FDIC 
auctions, we only count the number of the winners/non-winning bidders to avoid double 
counting. In total, 77 (79) publically listed banks submit 176 (333) non-repeating winning (non-
winning) bids in these 206 auctions. Stock market data for publically listed banks from 
September 2006 to December 2013 are collected from DataStream to calculate cumulative 
abnormal returns around the P&A announcements. Data on bank characteristics are derived 
                                                          
8 Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996) find that the best strategy of some agents is simply not to participate in the auction, although they cannot in 
this way avoid the negative external effects.  
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from both Call Reports of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) and 
the FDIC’s Summary of Deposits (SOD) database. 
 
Table 1 and 2 provide a summary of the number of failed banks, (publicly listed) winners 
and non-winning bidders in each state and year in the FDIC P&A auctions. The tables show 
that more than half of the P&A transactions involve failed banks in Georgia, Florida, California 
and Illinois while around 30% of all bidding banks are headquartered in these four states. Also 
the number of the failed banks increases significantly between 2009 and 2011.  
 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
          3.2 Empirical Methodology 
We first compute the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) to the winning as well as non-
winning bidding banks to capture any externality effects associated with bidding outcomes. We 
estimate the expected returns using the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model, augmented by 
the momentum factor as suggested by Carhart (1997). The model is: 
 
𝑅𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝑠𝑗𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑗𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑗𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝜖𝑗𝑡 
[1] 
where 𝑅𝑗𝑡 is the rate of return of the common stock of the 𝑗
𝑡ℎ bank on day t; 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the rate of 
return of daily equal-weighted CRSP index on day t 9; 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 is the average return of small 
market-capitalization portfolios minus the average return on three large market-capitalization 
                                                          
9 As noted in Jones et al. (2012), an equal-weighted market index is preferred over a value-weighted index as the banking industry has become 
an increasingly larger part of the market index in recent years.  
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portfolios; 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 is the average return on two high book-to-market equity portfolios minus the 
average return on two low book-to-market equity portfolios; 𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 is the average return on 
two high prior return portfolios minus the average return on two low prior return portfolios. 𝜖𝑗𝑡 
is a random variable. 
 
We estimate the abnormal returns (AR) for the common stock of the  𝑗𝑡ℎ bank on day t as: 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑡 = 𝑅𝑗𝑡 − (?̂?𝑗 + ?̂?𝑗𝑅𝑚𝑡 + ?̂?𝑗𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ̂𝑗𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + ?̂?𝑗𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡) 
[2] 
where the coefficients ?̂?𝑗, ?̂?𝑗, ?̂?𝑗, ℎ̂𝑗  and ?̂?𝑗  are ordinary least squares estimates of 𝛼𝑗, 𝛽𝑗, 𝑠𝑗, ℎ𝑗  
and 𝑢𝑗 .  
 
Consistent with previous work (e.g. Bruno et al., 2015), we estimate a separate estimate 
window of 250 trading days [-269, -20] for the Fama-French-Momentum four-factor model. 
We then compute the corresponding cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for the five-day event 
window [0, 4]. A standard cross-sectional standard deviation t-test is applied to test the 
significance of the CAR (see Brown and Warner, 1985). 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑡 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
 
[3] 
 
The event window is defined by the announcement date plus 4 trading days after the 
announcement since it can be reasonably assumed that the market cannot make an ex ante 
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prediction about the bidding outcomes owing to the FDIC’s strict confidentiality policy agreed 
by all FDIC approved bidders10. When a bidding bank submits more than one bid in different 
FDIC auctions on the same date, all on a Friday in our sample, its cumulative abnormal returns 
estimated for this event window are evenly distributed across various announcements. It is 
worth noting that using a 5-day event window in this study avoids the possibility of overlapping 
event windows since some frequent bidders participate in consecutive Fridays.   
 
For the second stage of our analysis, we run regressions of the CAR on a vector of bank-
level and deal-specific characteristics to examine the determinants of the externalities captured 
by non-winning banks’ cumulative abnormal returns: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗𝑊𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗𝐵𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿𝑗𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇𝑗𝑡 + 𝜃𝑗𝐵𝐼𝐷𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡 
[4] 
where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑡 is a non-winning bidder’s cumulative abnormal returns around the P&A 
announcements; 𝑊𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑗𝑡 is a vector of variables that captures different aspects of a 
winner’s characteristics that may be relevant to other bidders in a failed bank auction. We use 
three indicators to represent 𝑊𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑗𝑡  interchangeably in the estimations.  First of all, 
different sizes of banks may affect market competitive conditions differently (Berger et al., 
2004). The size of the winner in relation to the non-winning bidder is therefore included in our 
model as a relatively larger winner may be more likely to change the competitive conditions of 
the market. RSIZE is the ratio of the winning bank’s total deposits divided by the non-winning 
bidder’s deposit size in the year preceding the auction ranges. Second, WINFOC attempts to 
capture the winning bank’s market focus. Since the FDIC permits out-of-state banks bidding 
for failed banks, we use the ratio of the amount of deposits the winning bank holds in the state 
where the failed bank is chartered to its total deposits in the year prior to the P&A transaction. 
This variable measures the extent to which the winning bank is focused on the failed bank’s 
                                                          
10 This assumption is testable by examining whether significant CAR can be observed prior to the announcements, for example within an 
event window [-4,-1] of four working days before the announcement date. 
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home market or in other words whether it is relatively an incumbent bank or new entrant11. 
WINMS, on the other hand, measures the winner’s market share prior to the auction, which is 
its deposit market share in percentage terms in the state where the failed bank is based.  
 
𝐵𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑗𝑡 is a vector of variables that indicates the non-winning bidder’s own market 
position in the failed bank’s home market. Jehiel et al. (1999) broaden the assumption of the 
model developed in Jehiel et al. (1996) which states that negative externalities do not depend 
on the ‘sufferer’s’ identity. This relaxation of the assumption homes in on the fact that a non-
winning bank may suffer from negative externalities if the market is vital to the bank and its 
identity in the market, therefore, needs to be controlled for. We use BIDFOC and BIDMS as 
representations of 𝐵𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑗𝑡 interchangeably in the estimations. BIDFOC is defined as non-
winning bidder’s volume of deposits in the state where the failed bank is headquartered to its 
total deposits in the year prior to the auction. BIDMS indicates the non-winning bank’s market 
share of the total deposits in the failed bank’s market. We also control for the failed bank’s 
size. TARSIZE is the logarithm of the target bank’s total deposits in an FDIC auction which 
indicates the size of the customer base the winning bank acquires and the size of the transaction 
to some extent. The variable BID controls for the level of bidding competition, which may 
induce ‘winner’s curse’ effects for the winners and explain potential positive CAR to 
unsuccessful bidders. BID is the number of bidders submitting bids in an auction (in 
logarithms) that captures the interest the auction generates12. Table 3 presents summary 
statistics of key variables in Equation [4]. It shows that winning banks tend to be larger than 
non-winning banks and are more committed in the failed banks’ home markets prior to the 
auctions. 
 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
                                                          
11 Out of total 198 P&A transactions in our sample, 85 failed banks were acquired by a bank that is chartered in a different state.  
12 Note that the number of bidders submitting bids may not necessarily be the same as the total number of bidders as bidders may participate 
in the auctions but do not submit bids, the date on which, nevertheless, is not available.  
12 
 
 
4. Results 
Table 4 illustrates the FDIC auction externality effects captured by winning and non-
winning banks’ CAR (expressed as percentages) around the P&A auction announcements over 
the entire sample period and various sub-periods. Across all events, the average CAR to 
winning bidders is 3.76%, which is significantly positive at the 1% level. This result is 
consistent with previous findings in the literature (e.g. James and Wier, 1987; Cochran et al., 
1995; Zhang, 1997; Cowan and Salotti, 2015) and does not support ‘winner’s curse’ 
hypothesis. Unsuccessful bidders, on the other hand, experience a five-day mean CAR of -
0.75%, which is significantly different from zero at the 5% level13. The magnitudes of 
externalities vary with time. Generally, auction externalities seem to be primarily driven by the 
beginning and end of the sample period. Overall, the results suggest that the announcements of 
the FDIC P&A outcomes generate negative externalities for unsuccessful bidders.  
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
 
Having shown that the FDIC auctions create negative externalities, we now examine what 
the determinants of these externality effects are. The results reported are all winsorized using 
1% and 99% levels of the CAR at each auction announcement. Table 5 reports our regression 
results for the whole sample. A significant and positive coefficient on WINFOC indicates that 
unsuccessful bidders experience negative externalities when winning bidders enter a relatively 
new market by acquiring the failed banks. A significantly negative coefficient on BIDFOC in 
contrary suggests that there is a higher level of negative externality effects if the winners enter 
the key markets of the unsuccessful bidders.  The independent variable TARSIZE is also 
consistently significant in all regression estimations, which shows that non-winning banks 
suffer more auction externalities if the target banks are larger. The variable that measures the 
                                                          
13 We also estimate the CAR for winning and non-winning banks within an event window that is prior to the announcement date (i.e. [-4,-
1]). On average, the mean CAR is 0.02 and 0.062 percent respectively and both statistically indifferent from zero. These results, therefore, 
suggest that market cannot make an ex ante prediction about the bidding results and the choice of the event window in this study is appropriate. 
13 
 
level of bidding competition - BID, however, remains insignificant in all estimations, which 
again shows no support for the positive externality hypothesis. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
 
To further explore our dataset, we first split our sample into two sub-samples based on how 
frequently unsuccessful bidders participate in the FDIC auctions. The underlying reason why 
we choose this approach is that a frequent non-winning bidder may react differently to the ‘bad’ 
news that the failed bank is acquired by another bidder compared to infrequent non-winning 
bidders. If a bidder takes part in the FDIC auctions frequently (within the medium term), it may 
be relatively more aggressive in terms of expanding its market share. Therefore, this bidder 
may be less sensitive to certain failures of acquiring the targets, which therefore may not 
generate significant negative externalities since it can potentially bid for other targets again to 
make up its losses. It may also be possible that, on the other hand, an infrequent non-winning 
bidder participates in the auctions because it anticipates that some of its competitors will also 
bid for a specific failed bank. Therefore, infrequently non-winning bidders may be more 
sensitive to the undesirable auction outcomes and experience more significant negative 
externalities. On average, non-winning bidders submit four bids in various failed bank auctions 
between 2007 and 2003 in our sample. We therefore split our sample into one subsample that 
includes transactions that involve frequent non-winning bidders, who bid more than four times 
in total; and a second subsample that includes infrequent non-winning bidders, who bid no 
more than four times. Table 6 and 7 report the regression results for two subsamples – frequent 
non-winning bidders and infrequent non-winning bidders respectively. While the results 
remain consistent overall, it can be observed that failed bank auctions generate more significant 
negative externalities when infrequent non-winning bidders are involved. All three variables 
that indicate the winners’ competitive position RSIZE, WINMS as well as WINFOC are 
significant in all regression estimations. More specifically, these results further demonstrate 
that infrequent non-winning bidders experience more negative externalities when the winners 
are relatively larger and have larger national market share (beyond targets’ home markets). As 
far as the frequent unsuccessful bidders are concerned, the negative externality effects are 
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greater when the winning bidders have a relatively smaller market share in targets’ home 
markets. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
Furthermore, we divide the sample on the basis of whether the winning bidders win more 
frequently in the FDIC auctions or not as the non-winning bidders may react differently in each 
case to the auction outcomes. While a frequent winning bidder may adopt a more aggressive 
but less focused business expansion strategy, an infrequent winning bidder may tend to have a 
better identified target bank and be more determined to acquire it to gain competitive 
advantage. As a result, the identities of infrequent winning bidder may be more relevant to 
other non-winning bidders. In our sample, a winning bidder on average wins 2 different failed 
banks in the auctions. Therefore, the first subsample includes transactions that involve frequent 
winning bidders only, who win more than twice between 2007 and 2013; and the second 
subsample includes the infrequent winning bidders, who don’t win more than twice. Table 8 
and 9 show the estimation results of Equation [4] for the two subsamples respectively. The 
results generally suggest that non-winning bidders suffer from more substantial negative 
externalities if the winning bidders do not win often in the FDIC auctions, more specifically 
when the infrequent winning bidders are relatively new entrants in the target market. It is also 
worth noting that Table 9 shows a negative and consistently significant relation between non-
winning banks’ CAR and the number of participants submitting bids in an auction. This 
suggests that auctions involving infrequent winning bidders tend to generate greater interest 
and more negative externalities. 
 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
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To test the robustness of our estimation, we conduct a 1-tail bootstrap of our (cross-sectional 
standard deviation) t-test based on 1000 replications of the randomly chosen actual event dates 
(with a resampling ratio of 0.25) over the same sample period.  The results show that the CAR 
remain significantly negative at the 1% level, which suggests that our results are unlikely to be 
driven by pure fluke or data mining.  
 
In addition, a possible limitation of an event study is that the estimation of the CAR may be 
affected by confounding events. To rule out such possibility, we first exclude all the 
transactions if a specific bank submits more than one bid in different FDIC auctions on the 
same date; or if the same bidder participates in consecutive Fridays; or if a bidder makes a 
public announcement or experiences an event within the event window that may also affect 
share prices14. We then replicate our event study and regressions from Table 5, the results 
remain unchanged. In addition, we reduce the length of our event window to two days [0, 1] 
and four days [0, 3] to reduce any potential confounding effects. The findings again remain 
consistent15.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
During and after the recent financial crisis, the FDIC conducted a large number of P&A 
transactions that involved auctioning failed commercial banks and savings and loan institutions 
to healthy banks. This paper examines to what extent non-winning bidding banks experience 
negative externalities generated by the auction outcomes and what explains these externality 
effects. 
 
                                                          
14 We follow Bruno et al. (2015) and screen these announcements and events via Lexix/Nexix.  
15 To preserve space, the results are not reported and available upon request. 
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We first compute the cumulative abnormal returns of the bidding banks to capture the 
externality effects associated with bidding outcomes. In total, we identify 206 P&A 
transactions taking place from September 2007 to December 2013. We find that non-winning 
banks record a significantly negative CAR around the auction outcome announcements while 
there are significantly positive CAR to the winning bidders.  
 
We then use a multivariate regression model to test the determinants of negative 
externalities. The results show that non-winning banks experience significant and negative 
externalities when winning bidders enter a relatively new market by acquiring the failed banks. 
A number of further tests show consistent results and also suggest that negative externalities 
are more significant when infrequent non-winning and winning bidders are involved in the 
P&A transactions.  
 
Our study contributes to the literature in two important ways. First, as far as we are aware, 
we are the first to test the existence of negative externalities in auctions using market data. 
Moreover, we extend and update the literature on the FDIC failed bank auctions by examining 
non-winning bidding banks during the recent financial crisis.  
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Figure 1: Number of Failed Banks and Savings and Loan Institutions 2000-2013 
Data source: FDIC, 2014  
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Table 1: FDIC Purchase and Assumption (P&A) Transactions in States, 2007-2013 
State Targets Winners Non-winners 
Alabama  1  
Arkansas 1 3 3 
Arizona 5   
California 27 10 9 
Delaware  1 2 
Florida 30 2 4 
Georgia 32 8 6 
Iowa 2  1 
Idaho 1   
Illinois 18 4 4 
Indiana 3 3 4 
Kansas 4   
Kentucky 2 1 2 
Louisiana 3 2 1 
Maryland 1   
Michigan 2 1 1 
Minnesota  3 3 1 
Missouri 7 2 5 
Mississippi  2 2 
North Carolina 8 4 5 
Nebraska 2   
New Jersey 2 2 2 
New Mexico 3  1 
Nevada 2 1 2 
New York  3 4 2 
Ohio 5 6 5 
Oklahoma 3 1  
Oregon 2 1 2 
Pennsylvania 2 2 2 
Puerto Rico 2 2 2 
South Carolina 6 1 2 
South Dakota   1 
Tennessee 4 1 1 
Texas 7 2 3 
Utah   1 
Virginia 3 4  
Washington  9 3 3 
Wisconsin 1   
Wyoming 1   
In Total  206 77 79 
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Table 2: FDIC Purchase and Assumption (P&A) Transactions, 2007-2013 
Year Targets Winner's bids Non-winners' bids 
2007 1 1 3 
2008 12 12 15 
2009 53 51 60 
2010 56 54 93 
2011 41 34 84 
2012 31 19 57 
2013 12 5 21 
In Total  206 176 333 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics for data used in our regressions. Data on winners, non-winners and failed banks’ deposits are 
from the FDIC’s Summary of Deposits (SOD) database. Winner’s (non-winning bidder’s) business focus in target-state shows the percentage 
of the amount of the deposits the winning (non-winning) bank holds in the state where the failed bank is chartered to its total deposits in the 
year prior to the purchase and assumption transaction. Winner’s (non-winning bidder’s) market share in target-state is its deposit market share 
in percentage in the state where the failed bank is based. Data on total bidders, which is the total number of bidders submitting bids in the 
auction, are from the FDIC. 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Observations 
Winner's total deposits US$ Mil. 17788.122 41024.254 16.246 198407.561 333 
Winner's Business Focus  in target-state % 53.6021 45.5734 0 100 333 
Winner's market share in target-state % 0.9130 2.3740 0 27.4 333 
Non-winning bidder's total deposits US$ Mil. 7992.943 20345.953 268.174 151902.585 333 
Non-winning bidder's Business focus in target-state % 37.1379 41.2765 0 100 333 
Non-winning bidder's market share in target-state % 0.7721 2.0227 0 27.4 333 
Failed bank's total deposits US$ Mil. 778.1225 1606.906 26.617 12300 333 
Total Bidders 4.2985 1.6196 2 10 333 
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Table 4: Failed Bank Auction Externalities, 2007-2013 
This table summarizes the externalities of the FDIC purchase and assumption auctions between 2007 and 2013. The return generating model 
used to compute abnormal returns utilizes the 3-factor Fama-French (1992) model with an additional factor for price momentum for each 
winning and non-winning bidder in the sample and subsamples. The equal-weighted CRSP index is used as the market proxy. The event 
window is 5 trading days [0, +4] around the auction outcome announcement date. The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for the winning 
and non-winning bank are computed as the sum of the daily abnormal returns over the 5-day event window and presented in Panel A and B 
respectively. ***, **,* denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively based on a cross-sectional standard deviation 
t-test (see Brown and Warner, 1985) for differences in means and a Wilcoxon test for differences in medians. 
Panel A         
  Winner's bids CAR [0,+4] 
  Mean Median 
Standard 
deviation 
Total sample 176    3.76%***    1.84%*** 8.96 
September 2007-December 2009 64    6.78%***    4.09%*** 12.83 
January 2010-December 2010 54 1.47%** 1.43%** 5.52 
January 2011-December 2013 58   2.55%***   1.77%*** 4.41 
Panel B         
  
Non-winner's 
bids CAR [0,+4] 
  Mean Median 
Standard 
deviation 
Total sample 333     -0.75%**   -0.11%** 6.11 
September 2007-December 2009 81     -2.28%**   -1.30%** 8.42 
January 2010-December 2010 92 -0.36% 0.58% 7.27 
January 2011-December 2011 81 0.16% 0.47% 3.86 
January 2012-December 2013 79  -0.73%*  -1.10%* 3.33 
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Table 5: Determinants of Failed Bank Auction Externalities  
This table examines what determines the magnitude of failed bank auction externality effects using ordinary least square (OLS) regressions 
of non-winning bank cumulative abnormal return surrounding auction outcome announcements between 2007 and 2013. RSIZE is the ratio 
of the winning bank’s deposits divided by the non-winning bidder’s deposit size in the year preceding the auction. WINFOC (BIDFOC) is a 
ratio of the amount of the deposits the winning (non-winning) bank holds in the state where the failed bank is chartered to its total deposits in 
the year prior to the P&A transaction. WINMS (BIDMS) measures the winner (non-winner)’s market power prior to the auction, which is its 
deposit market share in percentage in the state where the failed bank is based. TARSIZE is the logarithms of failed bank’s total deposits in a 
FDIC auction. BID controls for the total number of bidders submitting bids in an auction (in logarithms). T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **,* denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Independent variables             
RSIZE -0.0001 -0.0001      
 (-0.43) (-0.62)     
WINFOC     0.0120** 0.0104*   
   (2.03) (1.76)   
WINMS     -0.0013 -0.0013 
     (-1.19) (-1.15) 
BIDFOC -0.0137**  -0.0155**  -0.0139**  
 (-2.16)  (-2.44)  (-2.20)  
BIDMS  -0.0006  -0.0006  -0.0004 
  (-0.44)  (-0.50)  (-0.29) 
TARSIZE -0.0068*** -0.0064*** -0.0057** -0.0054** -0.0061*** -0.0059** 
 (-3.01) (-2.75) (-2.46) (-2.26) (-2.65) (-2.47) 
BID -0.0080 -0.0071 -0.0072 -0.0064 -0.0083 -0.0075 
 (-1.16) (-1.02) (-1.04) (-0.92) (-1.20) (-1.08) 
Constant 0.0959*** 0.0853*** 0.0744** 0.0657* 0.0892*** 0.0797** 
  (3.03) (2.65) (2.24) (1.93) (2.77) (2.44) 
R-square 0.0428 0.0294 0.0544 0.0375 0.0464 0.0326 
No. of observations 325 325 325 325 325 325 
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Table 6: Determinants of Failed Bank Auction Externalities –Subsample: Frequent Non-winning 
Bidders  
This table examines what determines the magnitude of failed bank auction externality effects using ordinary least square (OLS) regressions 
of frequent non-winning bank cumulative abnormal return surrounding auction outcome announcements. The subsample under study includes 
transactions that involve frequent non-winning bidders only, which bid more than four times between 2007 and 2013. RSIZE is the ratio of 
the winning bank’s deposits divided by the non-winning bidder’s deposit size in the year preceding the auction. WINFOC (BIDFOC) is a ratio 
of the amount of the deposits the winning (non-winning) bank holds in the state where the failed bank is chartered to its total deposits in the 
year prior to the P&A transaction. WINMS (BIDMS) measures the winner (non-winner)’s market power prior to the auction, which is its 
deposit market share in percentage in the state where the failed bank is based. TARSIZE is the logarithms of failed bank’s total deposits in a 
FDIC auction. BID controls for the total number of bidders submitting bids in an auction (in logarithms). T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **,* denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Independent variables             
RSIZE 0.0001 0.0001      
 (0.62) (0.21)     
WINFOC   0.0071 0.0062   
   (1.29) (1.12)   
WINMS     0.0032** 0.0034*** 
     (2.52) (2.60) 
BIDFOC -0.0138**  -0.0136**  -0.0116*  
 (-2.11)  (-2.09)  (-1.80)  
BIDMS  -0.0036  -0.0035  -0.0032 
  (-1.48)  (-1.44)  (-1.32) 
TARSIZE -0.0033 -0.0024 -0.0025 -0.0017 -0.0041* -0.0034 
 (-1.50) (-1.08) (-1.09) (-0.75) (-1.89) (-1.54) 
BID -0.0068 -0.0061 -0.0056 -0.0052 -0.0073 -0.0069 
 (-1.06) (-0.94) (-0.88) (-0.80) (-1.15) (-1.08) 
Constant 0.0478 0.0335 0.0323 0.0204 0.0562* 0.0445 
  (1.56) (1.10) (0.99) (0.62) (1.85) (1.46) 
R-square 0.0302 0.0205 0.0358 0.0258 0.0557 0.0493 
No. of observations 226 226 226 226 226 226 
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Table 7: Determinants of Failed Bank Auction Externalities – Subsample: Infrequent Non-winning 
Bidders  
This table examines what determines the magnitude of failed bank auction externality effects using ordinary least square (OLS) regressions 
of infrequent non-winning bank cumulative abnormal return surrounding auction outcome announcements. The subsample under study 
includes transactions that involve infrequent non-winning bidders only, which bid no more than four times between 2007 and 2013. RSIZE is 
the ratio of the winning bank’s deposits divided by the non-winning bidder’s deposit size in the year preceding the auction. WINFOC 
(BIDFOC) is a ratio of the amount of the deposits the winning (non-winning) bank holds in the state where the failed bank is chartered to its 
total deposits in the year prior to the P&A transaction. WINMS (BIDMS) measures the winner (non-winner)’s market power prior to the 
auction, which is its deposit market share in percentage in the state where the failed bank is based. TARSIZE is the logarithms of failed bank’s 
total deposits in a FDIC auction. BID controls for the total number of bidders submitting bids in an auction (in logarithms). T-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. **,* denotes statistical significance at the 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Independent variables             
RSIZE -0.0013* -0.0011      
 (-1.75) (-1.57)     
WINFOC   0.0270* 0.0198   
   (1.80) (1.35)   
WINMS     -0.0045** -0.0048** 
     (-2.19) (-2.30) 
BIDFOC -0.0196  -0.0247  -0.0153  
 (-1.33)  (-1.62)  (-1.05)  
BIDMS  0.0004  0.0004  0.0014 
  (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.65) 
TARSIZE -0.0122** -0.0129** -0.0111** -0.0123** -0.0092* -0.0102* 
 (-2.36) (-2.34) (-2.12) (-2.19) (-1.70) (-1.82) 
BID -0.0061 -0.0050 -0.0101 -0.0084 -0.0129 -0.0124 
 (-0.36) (-0.29) (-0.60) (-0.49) (-0.77) (-0.74) 
Constant 0.1735** 0.1688** 0.1487* 0.1510* 0.1425* 0.1449* 
  (2.38) (2.22) (1.97) (1.89) (1.91) (1.90) 
R-square 0.1066 0.0901 0.1085 0.084 0.1224  0.1160 
No. of observations 99 99 99 99 99 99 
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Table 8: Determinants of Failed Bank Auction Externalities – Subsample: Frequent Winning Bidders 
This table examines what determines the magnitude of failed bank auction externality effects using ordinary least square (OLS) regressions 
of non-winning bank cumulative abnormal return surrounding auction outcome announcements. The subsample under study includes 
transactions that involve frequent winning bidders only, which win more than twice between 2007 and 2013. RSIZE is the ratio of the winning 
bank’s deposits divided by the non-winning bidder’s deposit size in the year preceding the auction. WINFOC (BIDFOC) is a ratio of the 
amount of the deposits the winning (non-winning) bank holds in the state where the failed bank is chartered to its total deposits in the year 
prior to the P&A transaction. WINMS (BIDMS) measures the winner (non-winner)’s market power prior to the auction, which is its deposit 
market share in percentage in the state where the failed bank is based. TARSIZE is the logarithms of failed bank’s total deposits in a FDIC 
auction. BID controls for the total number of bidders submitting bids in an auction (in logarithms). T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Independent variables             
RSIZE -0.0001 -0.0001      
 (-0.43) (-0.80)     
WINFOC   0.0056 0.0033   
   (0.69) (0.39)   
WINMS     0.0006 0.0013 
     (0.25) (0.53) 
BIDFOC -0.0235**  -0.0244***  -0.0239***  
 (-2.60)  (-2.72)  (-2.67)  
BIDMS  -0.0024)  -0.0022  -0.0027 
  (-0.92  (-0.84)  (-0.98) 
TARSIZE -0.0088*** -0.0078** -0.0082** -0.0074** -0.0089*** -0.0079** 
 (-2.61) (-2.24) (-2.30) (-2.04) (-2.62) (-2.26) 
BID 0.0074 0.0074 0.0075 0.0068 0.0071 0.0070 
 (0.80) (0.78) (0.81) (0.71) (0.77) (0.73) 
Constant 0.1042** 0.0845* 0.0926* 0.0777 0.1044** 0.0840* 
  (2.28) (1.82) (1.90) (1.56) (2.29) (1.80) 
R-square 0.0988 0.0559 0.1009 0.0522 0.0979 0.0531 
No. of observations 128 128 128 128 128 128 
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Table 9: Determinants of Failed Bank Auction Externalities – Subsample: Infrequent Winning Bidders 
This table examines what determines the magnitude of failed bank auction externality effects using ordinary least square (OLS) regressions 
of non-winning bank cumulative abnormal return surrounding auction outcome announcements. The subsample under study includes 
transactions that involve infrequent winning bidders only, which win no more than twice between 2007 and 2013. RSIZE is the ratio of the 
winning bank’s deposits divided by the non-winning bidder’s deposit size in the year preceding the auction. WINFOC (BIDFOC) is a ratio of 
the amount of the deposits the winning (non-winning) bank holds in the state where the failed bank is chartered to its total deposits in the year 
prior to the P&A transaction. WINMS (BIDMS) measures the winner (non-winner)’s market power prior to the auction, which is its deposit 
market share in percentage in the state where the failed bank is based. TARSIZE is the logarithms of failed bank’s total deposits in a FDIC 
auction. BID controls for the total number of bidders submitting bids in an auction (in logarithms). T-statistics are reported in parentheses.  
**, * denotes statistical significance at the 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Independent variables             
RSIZE -0.0003 -0.0003      
 (-0.36) (-0.39)     
WINFOC   0.0165** 0.0150*   
   (1.96) (1.79)   
WINMS     -0.0018 -0.0018 
     (-1.35) (-1.35) 
BIDFOC -0.0097  -0.0121  -0.0096  
 (-1.11)  (-1.39)  (-1.11)  
BIDMS  -0.0003  -0.0005  -0.0002 
  (-0.22)  (-0.32)  (-0.12) 
TARSIZE -0.0063** -0.0061* -0.0051* -0.0049 -0.0052* -0.0050 
 (-2.10) (-1.94) (-1.68) (-1.55) (-1.65) (-1.56) 
BID -0.0176* -0.0163* -0.0165* -0.0151 -0.0172* -0.0160 
 (-1.78) (-1.66) (-1.69) (-1.55) (-1.76) (-1.64) 
Constant 0.1022** 0.0942** 0.0755* 0.0679 0.0884** 0.0815* 
  (2.35) (2.12) (1.67) (1.46) (1.98) (1.80) 
R-square 0.0389 0.0329 0.0571 0.0481 0.0473 0.0412 
No. of observations 197 197 197 197 197 197 
 
 
